Contextual Dependencies in Information Systems Security by Bednar, Peter et al.
Association for Information Systems
AIS Electronic Library (AISeL)
WISP 2012 Proceedings Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security andPrivacy (SIGSEC)
Winter 12-14-2013
Contextual Dependencies in Information Systems
Security
Peter Bednar
University of Portsmouth, peter.bednar@ics.lu.se
moufida sadok
Higher Institute of Technological Studies in Communications in Tunis, moufida.sadok@gmail.com
Vasilis Katos
Democritus University of Thrace
Follow this and additional works at: http://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2012
This material is brought to you by the Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy (SIGSEC) at AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). It has
been accepted for inclusion in WISP 2012 Proceedings by an authorized administrator of AIS Electronic Library (AISeL). For more information, please
contact elibrary@aisnet.org.
Recommended Citation
Bednar, Peter; sadok, moufida; and Katos, Vasilis, "Contextual Dependencies in Information Systems Security" (2013). WISP 2012
Proceedings. 38.
http://aisel.aisnet.org/wisp2012/38
Bednar et al. Contextual Dependencies in IS Security 
 
Proceedingsof the Eighth Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Milano, December 14, 2013. 
1
Contextual Dependencies in Information Systems Security  
Peter Bednar1 
University of Portsmouth, UK 
Moufida Sadok2 
Higher Institute of Technological Studies in 
Communications in Tunis, Tunisia 
Vasilis Katos 
Democritus University of Thrace, Greece 
ABSTRACT 
This paper addresses the contextual dependencies related to the use of information systems 
security and criticizes the predominance of technical and formalized paradigm in the 
development and implementation of IS security policies and procedures. The underlying 
epistemology of our research lies in the interpretative paradigm. It explores the patterns of how 
the contextual use of information systems security is involved according to a 
business/organizational practice perspective. It elicits the detailed processes and practices that 
constitute the pragmatic perspective in developing information security activities. 
Keywords: Information systems security, contextual analysis, socio-technical analysis, 
user engagement, information systems methodologies 
INTRODUCTION 
Although there is a wide consensus in the information systems (IS) community that 
security should be incorporated in the complete IS analysis, development and implementation 
process, systematic and systemic treatment of systems analysis and development with elements 
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of information systems security (ISS) seemed to exhibit some belatedness. Siponen (2005) draws 
a distinction between IS, software engineering, computer science and mathematics and associates 
the different research communities with the mentioned disciplines. As such, researchers in the 
area of computer science and mathematics have a positivist orientation, whereas researchers in IS 
often subscribe to the interpretive paradigm. Irrespective of the separation between computer 
science and software engineering, it appears that the crucial factor that had an impact on the 
inclusion (or exclusion) of security practices in IS methodologies was the interpretivism vs. 
positivism view. For example in the commonly available academic reference work on IS 
development by Avison and Fitzgerald (2006), the reference to data centric focus of security is 
very pertinent. While ISS is not inherently excluded from IS development methodologies it is 
contextually taken for granted (e.g. not made explicit). IS methodologies mention security 
without explicitly providing methods for its implementation. Explicit ISS appears to fall mainly 
under the computer science discipline (usually positivist with an inherent focus on artefact 
development), strongly coupled with mathematics approaches (such as cryptography for 
example). A conceptual approach focusing on rational and formal descriptions leads work 
intended to cater for ISS in practice to almost solely focus upon data systems security. Therefore 
the result would tend to be developed independently of the needs of the surrounding human 
activity system. Unfortunately, ISS is dependent on human motivation and behaviour within the 
stakeholder context. This conceptual and paradigmatic mismatch explains the language espoused 
where people talk about “educating the user”; “train the user”; “make the user follow proper 
security procedures” and so on. It ignores the fact that as change is required from the user the 
system as a whole (human activity system) obviously was either not designed at all explicitly but 
as a result of unintended consequences of data system security design. The problem with 
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requiring people to change behaviour is that any professional activity is dealt with in an effective 
way due to some contextually relevant reason. To request people to change behaviour is to try to 
change organizational practices without understanding the effective behaviour of the involved 
stakeholders in the first place. We argue that a monolithic secure systems development 
methodology would be of limited value to IS. ISS functions are dependent on both human and 
infrastructural elements of an IS and should not be considered in isolation from each other.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, a review of existing practices 
found in the literature is presented. We move on to present highlights from the IS and secure 
systems domains, leading to the main contribution of this paper which is the identification of 
contextual perspectives of information systems security. 
EXISTING PRACTICES AND RELATED WORK 
According to the CSI (2011), CLUSIF (2012) and PWC (2012) reports an important 
percentage of the interviewed enterprises have proceeded to the formalization of their security 
policies and the assessment of security risks. The vast majority of them use different types of 
security technology and mainly antivirus software, firewall and intrusion detection system. A 
number of available standards (e.g. ISO 27001), guidelines (e.g. Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems), best practices frameworks (e.g. Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library) and methods (e.g. Operationally Critical Threat Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation) exist to assist organizations to manage information security, analyze risks and set-up 
efficient controls. The main recommendations of these reports are in favor of more training and 
education for the staff to guarantee more compliance to security policy guidelines as well as the 
formalization of the security organizational procedures to have more “standardized behavior”. 
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However, the existence of a security policy by itself does not mean its efficient 
application or relevance. In the case of the UK businesses (PWC 2012), 21% think the level of 
staff understanding is poor. The CLUSIF 2012 report shows that only 19% of the interviewed 
enterprises take into account the business process and not only focus on the data processes while 
analyzing risks. The internal security experts are the most common involved source in the 
assessment of security threats (CLUSIF 2012, PWC 2012). The malware infection, phishing, 
data corruption and laptop theft are the most type of attacks experienced according to the 
aforementioned reports. In fact, the employed security technologies can only prevent the already-
known attacks.  
One could furthermore argue that these reports are adopting a formal approach of security 
and confusing between information systems security and data systems security. The focus on a 
model of business process, rather than on a real world organizational context: As is clearly 
visible in the confusion between the territory and the map identifiable in IS analysis and design 
practices (Bednar, 2007). This means that ISS cannot be an add‐on but has to be an intertwined 
aspect of any IS design effort and change practice. Security processes which are modeled outside 
of the real world organizational context are prone to antagonize effective organizational practices 
and the literature maintains a plethora of such real world cases (Bednar and Katos, 2009). In the 
case study conducted by Kolkowska and Dhillon (2013), the workers noted that “The checks and 
balances that have been built into the system are not necessarily the way in which any of the 
case-workers operate” (ibid, p.8) and “They were also threatening us about the consequences of 
non-compliance. Nobody however focused on the reasons why people were not complying to the 
security rules” (ibid, p.10). In the ISS literature, various studies have argued for practice-based 
organizational frameworks of security policies and controls. The issues explored in this stream of 
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studies cover the influence of the contextual factors such as national culture (Yildirima et al., 
2011), organizational structure and culture, management support, training and awareness, users’ 
participation in the formulation process, business objectives, legal and regulatory requirements 
(Karyda et al., 2005; Knapp et al., 2009). Another focus of attention of ISS researches has been 
the compliance of employees to security procedures and guidelines viewed from behavioral 
perspective and applying socio-cognitive theories (Herath and Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Vance 
et al., 2012). Although understanding how organizational and environmental factors as well as 
compliance behavior may affect the efficient use of security controls questions about the 
relevance of security policies and measures are not addressed. The proposed models and 
frameworks focus more on the application of security policies, consider the need to shape and 
monitor the behavior of employees to ensure compliance with security requirements, and sustain 
the assumption that ISS is an add-on. We believe that the influence of users is crucial mainly in 
the early steps of the definition of security scope and objectives.  
ANALYSIS AND DESIGN OF SECURE SYSTEM 
As security analysis is closely coupled with risk analysis, the CRAMM methodology 
(UK's Central Computing and Telecommunications Agency's Risk Analysis and Management 
Method) is a widely used risk analysis methodology.  The identification of context according to 
CRAMM is based on the submission of questionnaires to systems users particularly data groups 
are employed to identify the sensitive assets and address the threats and vulnerabilities related to 
the identified assets. However, the assessment of security risks and threats needs tools for 
contextual inquiry under uncertainty and complexity (Katos and Bednar, 2008; Bednar and 
Katos, 2010). 
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The specific security methods, methodologies and standards are generally speaking 
structured, formalized, systematic and focus on formal behavior and actions of organizational 
members. To develop models of human behavior based on description of organizational activity 
will have little real world significance as can be seen through the history of IS development 
failures (see for example Morton and Hu (2008) analysis of ERP projects failure because the 
implementation is based on a technical-requirements rather than on business needs or context 
focus). A very possible attitude in organizational behavior is that security issues are turned a 
blind eye to. It is possible that in many organizations it is not acceptable to highlight security 
threats. The breaches security surveys outline the embarrassment of the interviewed enterprises 
about reporting the intrusions to third party outside the organization. People may not “want to 
know”, some will experience comments on weaknesses in security as comments on their 
personal competence. To highlight security threats brings with it several organizational, social 
and cultural dangers. People could find themselves accused of being a security threat, e.g. “if you 
had not mentioned the security threat it would not have been known and therefore not a 
problem”. This kind of phenomena means that there are real organizational incentives not to 
discuss or make an effort to prove any threat as that in itself would by definition be a breach of 
security and the employee might not be treated well as a result. People's unwillingness to admit 
and highlight real security threats could be justified by the introduction of regulatory controls 
and compliance (e.g. Sarbanes‐Oxley Act) which attempts to remedy this issue to some extent. 
By failing to appreciate the complex relationships between use, usability and usefulness, the 
security procedures imposed are not only subject to possible misuse but they are likely to be a 
core hindrance to everyday legitimate work. The weakest link is not necessarily in the (technical) 
system itself but the difference between the formal model of usage and real usage of system 
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content (data) as such in a human activity system. This realization leads Tryfonas et al. (2001) to 
propose an interpretive framework for expanding and incorporating the security functions in the 
whole IS development. 
CONTEXTUAL PERSPECTIVES OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
SECURITY 
In order to demonstrate the importance and necessity of the contextual dimension in the 
design of a secure information system, consider the case of the White Hats, Grey Hats and Black 
Hats. All three types of hackers employ the same modus operandi of breaking into systems, but 
with from different ends. White Hats are supposed to be the good guys, Grey Hats are supposed 
to be those White Hats who pretend to be Black Hats (that is the devil’s advocate), for example 
to test security measures. Black Hats are the bad guys. It is sometimes suggested (e.g. Mahmood 
et al. 2010) that there is a lot of research focusing on White Hats and not as much on Black Hats. 
But such a suggestion may be misleading as it is far from clear who is or is not White or Black 
Hat. In research White Hats are often assumed to be those who develop, promote and apply 
security policies and practices. Those who circumvent security policies and procedures for their 
personal gain are assumed to be Black Hats. A security breach is assumed by many security 
researchers to be identical with breach of security policy, further more it is also often 
automatically assumed to be causing damage to the business. However if policy was developed 
as an add-on to the real world business practices it is quite possibly the case that breach of 
security policy may in some instances be necessary as in practice it might be the only way for an 
employee to do a good job. The relevant consequential focus in security research is then taken 
for granted to be how to create countermeasures ‘so designed to lessening the damage caused’. 
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So instead of helping business actors to identify those security breaches that are the result of de-
contextualized policy making practices, this particular agenda can lead IS Security professionals 
to fail to recognize the real underpinning reasons for particular stakeholder behaviour. Explicitly 
ISS people are looking for how to create not just countermeasures but also retributions for 
violations of security measures. Research is suggested to be focused on collecting (what is 
assumed to be) black hat data by studying ‘those employees who do not have privileges on 
certain resources and yet make consistent attempts to access those resources.’ Such behavior is 
assumed to be ‘an insider threat’ and recommendations are made to look at ‘log data of 
enterprise single sign-on systems that typically monitor all authentication and authorization 
activities’. Unfortunately such data collection does not say anything about the reasons for why 
people feel it necessary to access resources which they have no official privileges for and so does 
not help to question the management assumptions about the appropriateness of any particular 
security policy in context of the real world work situation. Additionally to automatically treat 
employees as threat and suspects is a sure way to alienate those very employees that the 
management would like to have motivated for best business practice. Furthermore, the inherent 
political aspects and hidden agendas of information security controls may have an adverse effect 
on the goals of information security. For example, the access control for information security 
tasks is a component of the widely used information security standard ISO 27001. In practice, 
the choice and implementation of access control mechanisms are in a large extent influenced by 
the determination of the top managers to control the visibility, transparency and traceability of 
information flow in the organization. In this setting, security arguments can be used to sustain an 
organizational power game and defensive routines which limit the use of cognitive capacities, 
block communicative action and support a functional stupidity as described by Alvesson and 
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Spicer (2012). The IS users are under the control of the organization and afraid to lose their job 
will follow norms and rules even when they are not convinced about their appropriateness. 
Moreover, the use of quantitative metrics in the setting of a bureaucratic and centralized 
management to measure the productivity implies more formalization of procedures, practices and 
control mechanisms.  
A systemic view of security would result in a better understanding of organizational 
stakeholders of the role and application of security functions in situated practices and an 
achievement of contextually relevant risk analysis (Bednar and Katos, 2009). The study of 
Spears and Barki (2010) provides a particular application of this view in the context of 
regulatory compliance and confirms the conclusion that the engagement of users in ISS risk 
management process contributes to more effective security measures and better alignment of 
security controls with business objectives.   
CONCLUSION 
Security considerations have to be present as early as the design phase as it has been 
demonstrated historically that if security is treated as an afterthought and a bolt-on to the system, 
it will not serve its purposes. The data centric focus influences work practices and creates 
unintended consequences and changes in a human activity design instead of being a part of its 
design. Samela (2008) considers that business process analysis is understudied method when it 
comes to assess IS risks.  Moreover, IS analysis should understand and include the irrational 
behavior of the users. Ariely (2008) discusses assumptions about rational decision making 
process and argues for example that when it comes to motivation social norms could potentially 
be more powerful and efficient than money. Misleading assumptions about rational and irrational 
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behavior of users may explain many security measures failure. In this paper we argued that the 
challenge of introducing security in a sensible and useful manner can be addressed by 
considering the contextual perspectives. This conclusion can also be expressed in the following 
terms: “Knowing that systems with potential for meaningful use are available is a necessary, but 
not sufficient, condition to bring about desire for use in any particular individual. Work of 
developers is often perceived within a narrow, largely (socio-) technical definition of 
information systems. However, it must be recognized that such systems are inherently dependent 
not only upon their social but also individual and cultural sense-making context”. (p. 53. Bednar 
and Welch, 2006). 
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